Attacking Iran - Is the Price Too High to Pay?

By John Wood

Recently, Israel conducted a five-day emergency drill, the largest ever conducted by that nation. Just a year ago, in June 2008, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted a massive 100 plane exercise over the Mediterranean. Both these events are seen as preparation for an imminent attack by Israel on Iran. Most believe that Israel will again emerge victorious. Some believe that Israel might only be able to degrade Iran’s widely dispersed and extensive nuclear industrial complex. Few have considered the cost to Israel, in particular, resulting from Russian made air defense systems, such as S-300s, Tor-M1s and Pantsyr-S1s; or the damage that could be inflicted by Russian and Chinese supersonic anti-ship missiles on international shipping in the Straits of Hormuz. For the first time ever, Israel faces the distinct possibility of losing 20% to 40% of its aircraft, a price it may not be willing to pay. And the world could face the prospect of oil at $200 a barrel, a price it may not be able to afford.

On February 19, 2009, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that as of January 31, 2009, Iran had produced 1,010 kilograms of low enriched uranium. The President of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. David Albright, declared that Iran had achieved “breakout capability.” In other words, Iran had enough material to produce a nuclear bomb comprised of 20–25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Scott Kemp and Alexander Glaser, physicists and members of the research staff of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, believe the process of converting the low enriched into highly enriched uranium will take somewhere between eight months and three years. As Albright points out, the time frame may be shorter if Iran has other covert facilities to assist in speeding up the process. Clearly, Israel’s time to act is running out.

Iran does not possess a nationwide integrated air-defense network. It will therefore have to rely on defending its key nuclear facilities, such as the enrichment facility at Natanz, the conversion facility at Esfahan, the heavy-water facility at Arak, and the Bushehr nuclear power plant. This means that Russian made air defense systems such as S-300s, Tor-M1s and Pantsyr-S1s will be critical to whether Iran is able to fend off Israel’s air attack against these nuclear facilities. The lethality of a weapon system is called its “kill probability.” The S-300 has a single-shot kill probability of 80% to 93% for aerial targets. The Tor-M1 has an aircraft kill probability of between 92% and 95%. The Pantsyr-S1 has a kill probability of 70% to 95% against all targets. The A. Burke Chair in Strategy, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman, estimates that Iran has 15,000 men deployed in air defense, manning 1,700 anti-aircraft guns and more than 250 major SAM launchers. In addition, Iran has large numbers of Russian and Chinese man-portable SAMs.

Thus,  the IAF will be greeted by a large number and variety of Iranian air defense systems and missiles, which in of itself will increase the likelihood that it will suffer losses higher than it has ever suffered before.

Cordesman also estimates that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and Navy has a significant number of Chinese guided-missile patrol boats armed with anti-ship missiles. There are also a number of batteries of land-based anti-ship missiles in and around the Straits of Hormuz. Lastly, Iran has three ultra quiet Russian Kilo class submarines armed with Klub-S supersonic anti-ship missiles.

Iran’s anti-ship missile capability represents a clear and present danger to not just oil tankers, but also U.S. Navy vessels. Although the U.S. Navy is capable of handling Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles, according to Australian military expert Carlo Kopp, a salvo of six or more is likely to overcome even an Aegis warship’s defenses. The challenge is compounded by absence of a comprehensive U.S. Navy plan for dealing with supersonic anti-ship missiles.  Accordingly, the U.S. Navy can expect to suffer losses, perhaps, even that of an aircraft carrier, which would cost billions of dollars to replace.

In the final analysis, although an attack on Iran will be costly, the alternative, not just a nuclear Iran, but Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, would exact an even higher price from Israel down the road.

John Wood is a Senior Fellow at the American Center for Democracy. He is also the author of “Russia the Asymmetric Threat: A Potent Mixture of Energy and Missiles” to be published by Praeger Security International on June 30, 2009, and available on Amazon.com.